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Abstract 
Against a background of growing international and national carbon reduction legislation, 
the UK gover
energy efficiency and reduction in carbon emissions. This paper reflects on one English local 
the Green 
Deal. Drawing on social surveys and pre and post Green Deal intervention interviews with 
five demonstrator homes (households that applied to receive a Green Deal package fully 
funded by the scheme, providing a test bed for the Green Deal recruitment and installation 
process), this paper shows that awareness and understanding of the Green Deal scheme is 
low. There is opposition to the cost of finance offered but a strong interest in improving 
*Manuscript
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household warmth and for funding improvements through payments added to the electricity 
bill. Demonstrator home residents perceived Green Deals had improved the warmth and 
quality of their home, but saving money was the primary motivator for their involvement, not 
increasing warmth. Whilst Green Deal has not delivered the level of success that was hoped, 
much can be learned from the scheme to improve future energy efficiency schemes that will 
be necessary to deliver emission reduction commitments. 
Green Deal; Energy Efficiency; Carbon reduction; Housing; Fuel Poverty; Retrofit 
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Delivering Energy Efficiency and Carbon Reduction 
Schemes in England: Lessons from Green Deal Pioneer 
Places. 
1 Introduction 
As part of a wider international effort to reduce global CO2 emissions the UK 
Government is committed to an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 
levels (Climate Change Act, 2008). In addition, the UK is bound by the EU 20-20-20 targets 
which require a 20% reduction in EU Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, 20% of EU energy 
consumption to be produced from renewable resources, and a 20% 
energy efficiency, all by 2020.  
25 2 emissions are accounted for by the residential sector (DECC, 
2014a) making it a key area to target for carbon emission reductions through reducing energy 
consumption (Utley and Shorrock, 2008). The domestic sector has historically been ignored 
by UK legislature when compared to regulations and incentives applied to the industrial 
sector (Scott et al., 2014), however the increasing evidence base surrounding the 
consumption intensity is the key driving force behind increased awareness for the need of 
implementing residential energy and CO2 reduction policies 
Having gone fully live on 28th January 2013 the Green Deal 
 (Hough and White, 2014). By March 2014, Ed Davey, Secretary of State for 
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March 2015, 26  launch, 
501,906 Green Deal assessments had been lodged but only 5,964 Green Deal Plans were 
information required to disclose the Plan to future bill payers has been attached to the Plan 
and the energy supplier has all the information required to bill Green Deal 
2015a, p18).  
Coinciding with the launch of the Green Deal, the UK Government developed a local 
authority competition in 2012 supporting three funding streams around the themes of energy; 
Fuel Poverty fund, Green Deal Pioneer places (GDPP) fund, 
Collective Switching Fund (DECC, 2012a).  
Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council (BMBC) (a local authority in the north of 
England) brought together a partnership of organisations in late 2012 to bid for funding 
Specifically the consortium sought to receive funding from the GDPP fund which supported 
mbitious approaches to kick starting Green Deal activity in both the domestic and non-
a, p2). BMBC built a consortium that included: a local 
regeneration company as installation partners, a community organisation, and a university as 
monitoring and evaluation partners. BMBC was ultimately successful in securing funding 
with a programme focussing on three main components: 
1. Promotion of the Green Deal and encouraging consumer uptake  
2. Delivery of demonstrator homes and installation of Green Deals  
3. Monitoring and Evaluation 
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The scheme aimed to deliver 250 Green Deal assessments, with 75 households signing 
up to a Green Deal package of interventions as well as five demonstrator homes installed 
with a package of interventions. Reflecting the poor conversion from assessments lodged to 
to a Green Deal assessment or the installation of a Green Deal package. Against this 
background, this paper reports on the experiences, development opportunities and practical 
outcomes from the programme in Barnsley as part of the GDPP Fund. The scheme provided a 
good test bed for the Green Deal and delivered many points of learning, developing insights 
that can contribute to enhancing future energy efficient retrofitting schemes. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Energy efficiency in the English housing stock 
The English housing stock is relatively old in comparison with many other European 
countries with 41% of housing built before 1945 (Maliene and Malys, 2009). It is only since 
1965 that thermal considerations were included in building regulations for housing in the UK, 
yet 56.4% of English homes were built prior to the introduction of these regulations (DCLG, 
2014), and insulation was only required within the building fabric from 1974 (Boardman, 
1991). A focus on damp reduction, space and air movement up until 1974, rather than warmth 
has had a significant impact upon the current English housing stock which can be seen as 
(Boardman et al., 2005, p. 
38).  
Central heating was installed in only 16% of UK homes in 1964, but had risen to 88% of 
homes by 1996 (Rudge, 2012). This increase in the prevalence of central heating and a 
climate driven prolonged heating period from October to April (Hulme, Beaumont and 
Summers, 2013) has led to energy consumption from space heating rising from 57% of total 
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energy consumption in 1970 to 65% in 2013, while total domestic energy consumption has 
also risen from 36.9 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1970 to 43.8 mtoe in 2013 
(DECCC, 2014d). With the right building regulations and design policies, it is possible to 
reduce the length and intensity of this heating period and therefore reduce energy 
consumption and carbon emission outputs. There is scope to retrofit existing housing stock to 
make deep cuts in CO2 emissions but this is not a trivial task. Solutions for reducing CO2 
emissions from the housing stock must account for the variety in age, size, quality, 
composition, function, and social value of the physical buildings, as well as the different 
needs, expectations, and budgets of home owners and occupiers (Dowson et al., 2012).  
Domestic fuel consumption is strongly related to the size and composition of the 
household, as well as the type and structure of the property itself (Baker and Rylatt, 2008; 
Gough, 2013). Whilst the UK appears to be performing strongly in meeting its carbon 
reduction and GHG targets overall, trends in domestic energy consumption and GHG 
emissions have been erratic since 2009. Although consumption is below the peak 
consumption levels of 2004 and is now broadly on a downward trend, there has been an 
overall increase in domestic energy consumption over the period 1970 to 2012 of 16%, as 
well as an increase in levels of fuel poverty (Palmer and Cooper, 2014; Guertler, 2012). This 
is despite energy consumption in individual homes falling since 1970, which has been 
cancelled out by demographic and social trends towards lower household occupancy rates 
and a greater absolute number of houses.  
If the UK is to continue to meet its legally binding targets, energy efficient retrofit of the 
housing stock will be essential. Improving thermal standards of new housing alone is 
insufficient with roughly 85% of the current housing stock projected to still exist in 2050 
(Palmer et al, 2006). Failure to adequately insulate and upgrade the thermal quality of the UK 
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housing stock could present a major stumbling block in meeting the 2020 and 2050 targets. 
Pertinent to policy implementation is the fact that energy efficiency measures can be 
introduced as a measure to reduce energy consumption within the home (and therefore carbon 
emissions), to save money, or to improve the thermal comfort of the home (Blackhurst et al., 
2011). These types of policy therefore can be used as a method to reduce levels of fuel 
poverty1 as well as Greenhouse Gas emissions.  
Since 2004 the number of households living in fuel poverty has increased as rises in 
energy prices have outstripped growth in income and household energy efficiency levels 
(Seyfang, 2010; Guertler, 2012; Petrova et al., 2013). The implications of poor quality 
housing are a significant contributor to fuel poverty and are strongly linked with increased 
public health issues including the prevalence of asthma amongst children, respiratory illness, 
and mental health issues (Liddell and Morris, 2010). Housing can be seen as a critical part of 
healthy communities, both in terms of physical health and in terms of the psychological and 
social attitudes towards particular areas (Maliene and Malays, 2009; Brown et al., 2014). In 
addition, large scale energy efficiency retrofitting schemes can, if successful have the 
potential to help develop the local economy with jobs, education, new product opportunities 
and reduction in local energy consumption (Genovese et al., 2013; Killip, 2013). Therefore 
housing stock (Shove, 2010; Rosenow, 2012; Gough, 2013). 
A well designed policy with strong community engagement can aid Local Authorities in 
providing the types of interventions that are the most appropriate for their residents in order 
to reduce fuel poverty and household energy demand. To date community engagement is 
Fuel poverty is a phenomenon where households are unable to afford the energy costs required to heat their 
homes to suitable internal temperatures. This is usually defined as spending 10% of household income on 
energy costs. The 2011 Hills Review redefined this so that households are in fuel poverty if their fuel bills are 
above the national median and their remaining income is below the official poverty line (DECC, 2013).
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lacking in the policy arena. Scott et al. (2014) found from a survey of 279 households 
residents believed that the physical changes being made to their homes would lead to 
significant savings on their energy bills and that residents experienced benefits relating to 
improved appearances of their neighbourhoods and increased sense of pride in their local 
communities. Haines and Mitchell (2014) identified from a study of 33 households living in 
solid wall properties in the East Midlands region that, despite the variation in motivation and 
engagement towards energy efficiency schemes, there is the potential for energy efficiency 
schemes to be used as a method to improve household value, improve internal comfort, 
improve social standing, and as a mechanism to climb the property ladder.  These studies 
demonstrate the justifications for implementing energy efficiency measures in the home from 
a policy perspective but these reasons are not necessarily shared by those receiving these 
measures. 
2.2 A changing policy landscape 
Following the 2010 General Election, a Conservative party-led coalition was formed with 
the Liberal Democrats. The new Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced that he wanted 
 Two new 
schemes were quickly announced, the Green Deal, and the Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO), designed to improve residential energy efficiency, replacing the schemes that had 
previously been in operation, Warm Front, CERT, and CESP (see Mallaburn and Eyre (2014) 
for a comprehensive discussion of previous UK energy efficiency policies).  
The Energy Act 2011 (Energy Act, 2011) Green 
Deal proposal, to provide a market framework to improve the energy efficiency and reduce 
the CO2 Green Deal 
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was intended to provide energy efficiency measures that would feed into the wider targets 
 2008 (Climate Change Act, 2008). The scheme 
was designed to incentivise households to improve the energy efficiency of their homes at 
zero upfront cost, provided that installed , whereby the 
expected financial savings from reduced energy bills, must be equal to or greater than the 
upfront costs attached to the energy bill as a loan for repayment of measure installation, over 
a period up to 25 years. These loans are added to the electricity bills attached to the property 
(DECC, 2011b).  
The final impact assessment of the Green Deal (DECC 2011a) announced that the Green 
Deal and ECO schemes would support three Government objectives: 
 Reduction of GHG emissions 
 Address the drivers of fuel poverty 
  
However there were many objections to Green Deal. Experts did not expect it to aid 
-
(Guertler, 2012), and instead may increase fuel poverty (Hills, 2012). Similarly, the 
associated Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) intended to provide further support for low 
income households and the fuel poor (DECC, 2012a), has been seen as a regressive policy, as 
the costs of delivering the schemes are passed directly to consumers, which account for a 
larger proportion of income for those already on low incomes (Gough, 2013). 
The analysis of the uptake of conventional energy efficiency measures by Shorrock et al. 
(2005) highlights that certain retrofitting measures have more scope for installation than 
others arising from economic and technical feasibilities. Uptake in solid wall insulation 
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measures seem unlikely to reach saturation over the next few decades due to slow adoption 
and high capital costs, which must be reduced to around £2500 (for the whole house) for the 
procedure to become cost effective. It is unclear that the mechanisms for funding in the Green 
Deal will overcome this capital barrier due to the lack of subsidies and a reliance on creating 
private markets (Dowson et al., 2012).  
After disappointing initial Green Deal uptake, the UK Government was compelled to 
(Hobson, 2013). 
and Sunstein, 2008, p.6). To further promote uptake, the Green Deal Home Improvement 
Fund (GDHIF) was launched in June 2014. The scheme offered up to £7600 cash back to 
householders installing approved measures from the Green Deal (DECC, 2014b). Limited 
funds were made available in different time-limited funding waves. At a local level, schemes 
were in operation that took advantage of the key drivers of behavioural change of occupiers 
to encourage uptake of energy efficiency measures, going beyond financial incentives. These 
incentives were based on changing individual values and attitudes to drive behaviour and 
choices (Brown et al., 2014). These types of schemes are what Shove (2010
influencing individual 
behaviour as well as financial incentives. 
2.3  Local housing characteristics in Barnsley 
This study focussed on Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council (BMBC) in the South 
Yorkshire area of England. Barnsley has a population of 231,221, according to 2011 census 
statistics. The Barnsley MBC Home Energy Efficiency Strategy 2011-2015 provides a 
succinct analysis of the current housing situation within the region (BMBC, 2011). From both 
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a fuel poverty and general energy efficiency perspective there was a potential for a large 
market for Green Deal and ECO supported interventions within Barnsley. The composition of 
the housing stock within the Borough poses a particular challenge for insulating, primarily 
due to the large number of solid wall properties. Many council-owned properties had been 
improved through the Decent Homes scheme; therefore the average SAP2 score for a 
Barnsley council owned property by the end of 2010/11 was 72, which is 27 points higher 
than a solid wall privately owned property in the Borough. Within Barnsley there are 
estimated to be around 23,000 homes built before 1919 and the vast majority of these were 
constructed with solid wall houses. This type of housing represents around 28% of private 
sector homes with an average SAP score of 45. To date, despite the council investing heavily 
in private sector homes, the average SAP rating in private sector homes in Barnsley is a 
meagre 57, below the target of 65 or above, which is seen as a proxy for the household being 
free from fuel poverty.  
According to the Fuel Poverty statistics for 2012, Barnsley had 102,956 homes in the 
Local Authority area, of which 16,724 were deemed to be living in fuel poverty based on the 
traditional 10% measure, representing roughly 16.2  (DECC, 
2014e). The figure is lower than the regional average for Yorkshire and the Humber of 17.4% 
but higher than the national average of 14% (DECC. 2014c). Two lower super output areas 
(LSOAs) around central Barnsley, have significantly higher levels of fuel poverty, and 
therefore were the focus for the GDPP.  
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3 Methods  
Two distinct modes of enquiry were designed in order to respond to aims one and two of 
the scheme. A residential survey was designed in consultation with delivery partners that 
examined multiple aspects of the Green Deal and surrounding home improvement/energy 
efficiency attitudes to assess the effectiveness of Green Deal promotion and examine how to 
encourage further consumer uptake (aim one). In responding to aim two, the delivery of 
demonstrator homes and installation of Green Deals, semi-structured interviews with 
demonstrator home residents were held prior to the installation of Green deal packages in the 
property and one month after completion of building work. 
3.1 Resident survey 
The intention of the survey was to build an understanding of the levels of awareness of 
the Green Deal, energy efficiency attitudes more generally and home improvement intentions 
from a broad cross-section of Barnsley residents. This data was intended to provide a more 
expansive background to the Green Deal barriers and opportunities in the locality, 
complementing the more detailed yet narrower range of evidence that would be collected 
from the interviews with residents of the five demonstrator homes. 
Questions for the survey were informed by DECC commissioned Green Deal research 
completed prior to the launch of the Green Deal (DECC, 2011c, 2012b), along with policy, 
third sector papers, and academic literature (c.f. Jenkins, 2010; Dowson et al. 2012). Utilising 
this existing evidence base allowed the project to build upon the extant research in the field 
and to develop an understanding of the realities of Green Deal implementation following the 
launch of the scheme.  
The survey was designed to take around ten minutes to complete and consisted of 12 
questions (see table 1) plus demographic profiling information. In order to maximise 
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response, the survey was delivered across multiple platforms utilising digital (on-line) and 
traditional paper copies of the survey. The survey was publicised on-line on the council web-
site and residents  forums, via social-media, at official council resident support events, 
through email distribution lists, and through Green Deal Pioneer Places roadshows run by the 
project team in libraries throughout the Borough.  
Table 1 here 
Limited response questions were designed to facilitate ease of response with open ended 
other  categories provided for relevant questions. Question one offered six potential 
descriptions of the Green Deal scheme, the option to declare the respondent was not aware of 
aw
or fuel poverty reduction to a home improvement loan. Respondents were free to choose all 
options they felt relevant with all options plausible descriptions of one or more aspect of the 
scheme. A similar format was followed for question two, how information on the Green Deal 
had been received, and three where a non-exhaustive list of nine broad energy efficiency 
interventions was presented to respondents, all of which were available under the Green Deal. 
They represented the most common energy saving interventions that were being highlighted 
by Government produced Green Deal supporting leaflets at the time of going to print.   
In order to understand  of the Green deal, questions four and five 
presented lists of possible benefits or concerns raised in the pre-launch market research 
(DECC 2011c, 2012b). Respondents were asked to rate how important each one was to them, 
on a five point Likert scale from  The section 
concluded with three questions examining financial aspects of the scheme, with respondents 
asked to highlight a single choice from a limited range of potential responses. 
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Section B of the survey focussed more generally on household improvement intentions 
and sought to examine  household energy efficiency improvement intentions and 
how they would choose to finance and complete any improvements. Furthermore, the survey 
asked where householders would seek advice on undertaking home improvements from in 
order to understand the locations and individuals that would be best placed to help promote 
the Green Deal scheme.  
3.2 Pre and Post building work Interviews 
In order to develop a detailed understanding of the Green Deal process from assessment 
to installation, five demonstrator homes were recruited by the community organisation and 
local regeneration company project partners. Demonstrator homes received an occupancy 
assessment (OA) and recommendations as per stage one and two of the Green Deal customer 
journey (DECC, 2010), with the OA completed by an accredited assessor employed by the 
local regeneration company. They were free to select which of the recommended 
interventions they wished to 
the local regeneration company funded by the scheme, and as such no Green Deal finance 
package was arranged with the households. 
The demonstrator homes were spread across the target wards of the GDPP project and 
offered a number of different types of construction including traditional solid wall terraces, 
semi-detached solid walled homes and more recently constructed and subsequently extended 
cavity wall homes. A brief summary of the demonstrator homes and their basic characteristics 
is listed in table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here 
In August 2013, prior to the commencement of building work, in-depth interviews were 
held with the residents of the five project demonstrator homes. In order to allow interviewees 
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the opportunity to develop ideas and expand upon topics raised by the interviewer, and for the 
-structured approach was adopted 
(King 2004; Denscombe, 2007). The interview explored four main topics: 
1. About the home  likes/dislikes, energy efficiency and energy bills  
2. Being a demonstrator home  Why? How were they recruited? Experiences so 
far. 
3. The installation process  Have they felt informed? Do they foresee any impacts 
on their daily lives?  
4. Expectations / outcomes  What do they think / hope will result from the work.  
To supplement the interview data, a video-tour of the home was undertaken with the 
residents providing an audio description of the home, what they liked, what their frustrations 
were and any changes they had already made to them 
Following the installation of each household s Green Deal interventions, researchers 
returned to complete post intervention interviews in October 2013. This meant that 
households had lived with their improved home for around one month prior to the second 
interview. Again, a video tour of the home was completed in order to capture the changes to 
the home. This was followed up with another semi-structured interview exploring: 
1. Installation process  Evaluation of the professionalism of tradespeople. Were 
instructions given for new equipment? Were the participants kept informed 
throughout? 
2. Effects and Outcomes  Did work meet expectations? Ease of use for any new 
technology? Did the participants make any changes to way they use the home? 
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What were the householder perceptions of effects on household bills? Did the 
interventions cause the respondents to make any more energy efficiency changes 
to the home? 
3. Overall Process  What difference did the interventions make to the home/life of 
the participants? Would the participants Green 
Deal the participants recommend it to others?  
The audio recordings of both pre and post intervention interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and thematically analysed in NVivo utilising an inductive coding approach, 
informed by the interview question schedule. This was used to identify commonalities and 
differences between the demonstrator homes experiences, motivations, 
expectations and outcomes, adding strong contextual data to support or contrast the analysis 
of the broad residential survey. 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Resident Survey 
In total 165 surveys were completed by residents from across the local authority. Due to 
the multi-modal distribution method it was not possible to calculate the overall response rate. 
51% of respondents were male and 49% female with 95.3% of respondents classifying 
themselves as white, 2.7% of mixed white and black backgrounds and 2% who preferred not 
to declare. Further monitoring statistics are provided in table 3. The modal wage was £20,000 
- £39,000, broadly encompassing the average UK wage of £27,200 (ONS, 2014), however 
only 39% of respondents identified themselves as in full time employment, compared to a 
UK employment rate of 71.7% in October 2013 (ONS, 2013). The findings of the survey 
should therefore only be seen as indicative rather than statistically representative of the 
general population. However the survey provides a number of insights 
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perception of the Green Deal that could be useful for improving future iterations of the 
programme. 
Table 3 Here 
4.1.1 Green Deal Knowledge 
Figure 1 Here 
The survey asked respondents what they knew about the Green Deal without having 
provided them with any explanation of the scheme. As can be seen in figure 1, the most 
Green Deal
general awareness. compare responses with 
profiling characteristics including age (r(150) = -.025 p>.05), ethnicity (r(149)= .002, 
p>.05),employment status (r(144)= -.156, p>.05), household income (r(142)= .006, p>.05), 
tenure (r(148)= -.115, p>.05) and accommodation type (r(151)= -.087, p>.05). No 
significant results were returned, suggesting that awareness of the Green Deal was not related 
to any demographic profiling characteristics and as such work should be undertaken to raise 
awareness of the scheme generally rather than within any specific sub-section of the 
community. A similar result was experienced when residents were asked how they had 
received information about the Green Deal. As figure 2 demonstrates, the modal response 
I was not previously aware of the Green Deal scheme , selected by 36% of respondents. 
Figure 2 Here 
Internet sources (25%) and radio (16%) were the most common source of information on 
the Green Deal, but there were only a small number of respondents citing newspapers (local 
[8%] or national [5%]) as a source of information. The relatively poor response to 
newspapers as a source of Green Deal information was unexpected as the press has been one 
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of the few sources to present information and commentary on the Green Deal scheme, and the 
local newspaper (the Barnsley chronicle) ran an advertising campaign promoting the scheme. 
A similar degree of confusion surrounded awareness of the types of improvements to the 
home that could be supported by the Green Deal. When asked which of these interventions 
were available under the Green Deal
nine forms of improvements available. 
Given the general lack of awareness of the Green Deal recorded, this survey suggests that 
more must be done to increase consumer knowledge of the scheme, and what energy 
efficiency improvements are available to be installed.  
4.1.2 Green Deal in Operation: Perceptions of Benefits and Concerns 
The results of the questions regarding perceptions of the potential benefits of Green Deal 
are presented in figure 3. 
Figure 3 Here 
Generally, respondents found all potential benefits to be important or very important to 
them, with only small numbers finding aspects of the potential benefits relatively 
unimportant.  Indirect benefits (such as improving community environment) were seen as less 
important to respondents than personal benefits (such as improved household warmth) whilst 
there was a spread of responses to the suggestion that the Green Deal could increase the value 
of the home. Whilst retrospectively indirect benefits (such as neighbourhood enhancement) 
have been valued in other energy efficiency schemes (Scott et al., 2014) their value as a 
scheme promotion tool is not supported by our findings.  
As with perceived benefits of the Green Deal, respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of ten potential concerns with the Green Deal. Again, respondents predominantly 
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rated the potential concerns as important or very important (see figure 4), with a neutral 
response the next most common answer. Given the spread of responses and the use of a five 
point Likert scale, the results can be seen to be reliable, offering a central anchor of opinion 
(Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). Much of the national commentary on the Green Deal saw the 
need to pass a credit check to access the Green Deal loan as a major barrier to the Green Deal 
supporting those in the greatest need. 27% of respondents had a self-declared annual income 
less than £20,000 which would reduce their likelihood of qualifying for Green Deal funding. 
Despite such a large number of lower income households responding to the survey, there was 
a lower level of concern expressed about passing a credit check than may have been 
intuitively expected. 
Figure 4 Here 
4.1.3 Paying for an energy assessment 
The Green Deal involves an initial Green Deal Advice Report (GDAR). Most commonly, 
the cost of this assessment is passed on to the consumer, although some companies now offer 
the service for free as long as the householder then utilises the services for provision and 
installation of the recommended interventions. Survey respondents were asked about their 
willingness to pay for a GDAR with seven payment levels available to choose from, between 
nothing and £150+.  Although 27.9% of respondents were unwilling to pay anything for their 
GDAR, the most common response was a willingness to pay less than £50, taking 29.7% of 
the responses (see figure 5). Very few respondents were willing to pay over £100 (5.4% of 
respondents), suggesting that the current average GDAR cost of £120 is a significant barrier 
to Green Deal uptake. These results suggest that the decision to include a rebate of up to £100 
towards GDAR costs as part of the GDHIF (DECC, 2014b) since the completion of the 
GDPP programme, is likely to enable a significant increase in interest around the Green Deal. 
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Figure 5 Here 
Another source of early criticism of the Green Deal was the interest rate associated with 
the Green Deal loan. The Government argued that the average interest rate would be the best 
high street interest rate (Hough and White, 2014) for an unsecured personal loan. The final 
rate set was 6.96% (which is actually between eight and ten% when administrative costs are 
included) and can be beaten by many home owners, who can access low interest loans 
through their mortgage provider (Hough and White, 2014). For households from lower 
income backgrounds, the interest rate is perceived to be a significant deterrent to Green Deal 
uptake (Briggs, 2014) amongst potentially some of the households that could benefit the most 
from energy retrofit. Respondents were asked what the highest interest rate they would be 
willing to agree to for a Green Deal loan; between one and ten percent, presented in one 
percent increments, the results can be seen in figure 6. 
Figure 6 Here 
The highest interest rate any respondent was willing to pay for a Green Deal loan was 
6.9%, whilst the most popular answer was an interest free loan. A number of respondents 
were not sure what level of interest they would be happy to accept, though the reasons for this 
were not investigated. Interestingly, the second most common interest rate for a Green Deal 
loan response was an interest rate between 3.0% and 3.9% percent. This suggests that whilst 
the current interest rate is too high to entice most consumers to utilise the Green Deal 
payment mechanism, if providers or the government could reduce the interest rate offered to 
the levels offered by some high street banks to mortgage holders (Hough and White, 2014), 
there is a potential for increased uptake of the Green Deal scheme.  
over the forthcoming year, where they would search for information related to these works, 
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who would undertake the work and how it would be financed. When asked how they would 
prefer to fund a home improvement designed to increase warmth, almost half (49.3%) stated 
they would prefer to pay through an extra charge on their electricity bill (see figure 7). This 
suggests that development of this mechanism may provide a platform with which to 
encourage and facilitate investment in domestic energy efficiency improvement. 
Figure 7 here 
Approximately a quarter of respondents stated an intention to undertake home 
improvements to improve the warmth of their home over the next 12 months, whilst 56% 
stated they had no intention. 19% did not know whether they would undertake improvements. 
If these results were represen  would imply around 24,000 
homes intended to undertake home improvements to increase warmth or energy efficiency 
over the following year. Clearly there is an appetite to improve household warmth which 
shows potential for Green Deal or similar mechanisms to succeed.  By tackling the barriers 
discussed above, the Green Deal could see a significant increase in uptake compared to 
current levels 
regarding reducing domestic energy consumption and fuel poverty levels. 
4.2 Pre and Post Green Deal Demonstrator Home Interviews 
4.2.1 Being a Demonstrator Home 
All five of the demonstrator homes had a lower than typical energy cost according to the 
occupancy assessments undertaken as part of the programme of work. This is partly due to 
the participants heating their homes for far fewer hours per day than the average typical for 
that type of household according to the occupancy assessment. For the demonstration of the 
GDPP, partners were concerned that this would reduce the potential impact of any savings 
that were made due to the interventions. When the demonstrator home residents were 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
  
interviewed, discrepancies were found between the amount of heating declared on the 
occupancy assessments and the time period of heating given by the occupants. For example, 
residents of demonstrator home three stated that: 
two to two and a half hours in the 
morning. Winter months from about half past three till ten, about six and a half  
In contrast the occupancy assessment for this demonstrator home suggested their heating 
was on only 15 minutes per day, a notably different amount of heating to that declared by the 
occupants. As a result 
Green Deal interventions were allayed as actual heating use prior to the installation of 
interventions was greater than that calculated in the occupancy assessment, so the 
interventions were likely to bring tangible benefits to the occupants. Nevertheless the Green 
Deal occupancy assessment helps occupants decide whether they feel willing to take on a 
Green Deal, and inaccuracy in the data provided may lead households to unfairly under or 
overestimate the potential benefit of installing different energy interventions.  
Demonstrator home occupants were generally very energy aware, and had a good idea 
what aspects of their home were inefficient. A common source of frustration amongst all the 
solid walled properties was their inefficiency and the cost to householders in terms of heating 
bills. For example, an occupant of demonstrator home one said: 
no cavity wall insulation in it, the heat just goes straight through it. So, no matter what, how 
long you have the heating on for, you can turn the rad valve up to number five, up to full; that 
 
Whilst demonstrator home occupants were aware of their energy usage and costs, they 
were not major adopters of basic energy saving interventions. The use of energy saving light 
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bulbs was limited to a few rooms if any, often citing issues to do with light levels. Some 
chose to turn electrical devices off at the wall when not in use, though this was not the case 
with all homes. Demonstrator home two was owned by occupants who had benefited 
significantly from a number of schemes aimed to support older households. Through these 
earlier schemes they had received loft insulation and had received a new boiler a number of 
years ago, both of which they felt had made a noticeable difference to their home.  Residents 
of demonstrator home four had introduced a partition wall in to their lounge, sacrificing 
overall space in an attempt to increase warmth. Whilst this had made some impact the home 
was still generally very cold and expensive to heat. They had gone further by installing 
insulation in the loft space at their own cost, but this was the most that any demonstrator 
home occupants had undertaken at their own expense. Generally, interventions such as these 
were seen as expensive and beyond the reach of the householders taking part. The consensus 
from the occupants of the demonstrator homes was a recognition of the potential benefits of 
the interventions but a lack of willing or ability to fund this work themselves, hence their 
interest in the scheme. 
4.2.2 Work completed on Demonstrator Homes 
Table 4 Here 
Not all occupants of the demonstrator homes agreed to the entire package of 
recommended interventions or were able to receive certain interventions due to space 
restrictions. The final interventions installed are summarised in table 4. Residents of 
demonstrator home three ultimately decided to turn down a boiler replacement as they felt 
their current boiler was good enough.  In this property, due to access space their side wall 
could not be insulated and the resident chose not to accept internal insulation to the front wall 
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due to the reduction in internal space. The occupants of demonstrator home four also rejected 
internal solid wall insulation to their property due to space reduction implications.  
A key learning point for the project is the importance of individual choice and designing 
existing practices in the home (Judson and 
Maller, 2014; Shove, 2010). This could prevent rejection of potentially beneficial measures 
such as external wall insulation and internal wall insulation, which will have implications for 
the look and/or size of a property.  Although householders stated a desire to reduce their bills, 
ultimately pride in their homes space and look could provide enough of a deterrent to prevent 
the most effective interventions from being installed. 
4.2.3 The installation process and post-intervention benefits 
Demonstrator homes were generally very pleased with the process of being involved in 
the project. Overall all households were very pleased with the work of the firm carrying out 
the interventions and were particularly complimentary of the Residents Liaison Officer 
(RLO) who kept them informed and updated throughout the project. Demonstrator home 
occupants that were in full time employment felt that it was sometimes frustrating to have to 
organise someone to be at home, or take time off work themselves at the last minute, in order 
to unlock their home. This practical aspect of installing energy efficiency measures, the 
residents to plan 
their time in advance to help ensure smooth project delivery.  A resident of demonstrator 
home one summed up the balance between the inconvenience of the work and the ultimate 
benefits: 
nought. It's nothing, you 
-  
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This response also demonstrates further evidence of the well documented rebound effect 
(Jenkins, 2010; Blackhurst et al., 2011; Druckman et al., 2011.), whereby a proportion of the 
money saved from increased energy efficiency is utilised to increase the consumption of 
energy in the home such that the expected level of bill reduction is not realised. In other 
studies this has been shown to be around 30% (Milne and Boardman, 2000; Druckman et al. 
2011,). It is important for this effect to be considered in the design of GHG reduction 
schemes in order to maximise potential GHG reduction, whilst balancing the benefit of the 
rdman, 2000) in increased warmth to the householder.     
The return visit following the installation of the interventions was only around one month 
following the completion of the intervention work due to the timescale for project delivery, in 
October 2013. As such residents were not able to assess the impact of the interventions on 
their energy bills and instead their subjective perception of the potential impact was explored. 
Other than demonstrator home three which could not have the major insulation work 
completed, all demonstrator homes agreed that their homes felt much warmer, would be 
much warmer in the forthcoming winter and expected their bills to be lower. Demonstrator 
home four and five who had both received a new boiler as well as insulation were particularly 
happy that they now had instant hot water and in demonstrator home four
had been classified as dangerous and immediately removed by engineers, had been safely 
removed before anything serious had happened.  
Due to the project specification and funding, post-intervention SAP assessment of the 
demonstrator homes were not completed and thus it is difficult to precisely quantify the 
impact of the Green Deal interventions provided. This work would benefit from a follow up 
study calculating the revised SAP score for the homes as well as analysis of household 
energy bills to quantify efficiency improvements and rebound effects. 
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Whilst the demonstrator homes did not pay for any of the work done to their homes, 
when asked if they would have had the work done as a Green Deal, four out of five homes 
said they would. Such was their pride in the work that had been done, residents of 
demonstrator homes one, two, four and five had shown off the work done to friends and 
colleagues and ha Green Deal. The demonstrator home 
experience provided the programme with homes that had received major energy efficiency 
benefits as a direct result of the scheme. Not only had energy efficiency been improved, but 
so had useable space in the home, whilst in a number of cases reducing damp and increasing 
resident happiness. The demonstrator homes can be seen as a major success for the project in 
the short term, and hopefully the long term. All households provide a strong example as to 
how the interventions available in the Green Deal can offer improvement in quality of life 
and home energy efficiency. It is important in the future that these benefits are tracked to 
understand and quantify their benefits in terms of bill reduction and resident emotional and 
physical health to help demonstrate the long term potential benefits of such schemes. 
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The Green Deal attempts to use a system of financial incentives to overcome economic 
barriers in order to solve technical problems (Dowson et al, 2012), as well as to attempt to 
overcome the inertia of householders through the use of nudge approaches (Thaler and 
Sustein, 2008) towards engaging with energy efficiency schemes.  
The resident survey undertaken by this project confirms that the financing mechanism 
appears to dissuade the public from taking out measures at the scale required to enable the 
scheme to be a success, often due to the high interest rate attached to the scheme and the cost 
of the GDAR, although the principle of paying for energy efficiency improvements through 
the electricity bill was widely supported.  The way in which the Green Deal is financed is 
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unlikely to be of benefit to vulnerable households, and therefore local authorities may find 
that they have to consider bringing some capital resources of their own to the table, to 
supplement ECO funding if the scheme is going to assist in a significant manner in the fight 
against fuel poverty. With local authority expenditure needing to fall by 21 per cent in cash 
terms by 2020 and an associated 43 per cent drop in funding for non-social care and waste 
services (LGA, 2014), the potential for local authorities to undertake such discretionary 
spending is incredibly limited. 
Although the Green Deal has been a difficult proposition to market and encourage 
uptake, there is a desire to reduce bills and increase home energy efficiency amongst home 
owners. Developing a more attractive financial offering and significantly increasing 
awareness of the scheme amongst the community at a local, regional and national level could 
provide enough support to create a thriving energy intervention scheme that develops enough 
momentum to sustain itself and achieve ambitious Government objectives relating to 
improving domestic energy efficiency and reducing energy consumption levels. However, the 
experiences of the Green Deal Pioneer Places Scheme in Barnsley highlight a problem with 
the levels of awareness of the scheme; indeed most of the respondents surveyed had not heard 
of the scheme and had not received information on the scheme through any of the traditional 
media.  
To increase engagement and uptake of Green Deal, greater awareness is required, and 
emphasis should be placed upon the benefits to the home in terms of bill reduction and 
increased warmth that will outweigh the initial upfront investment and subsequent loan 
payback payments. Despite the ultimate benefits expressed by the demonstrator homes, our 
survey suggests that unless the upfront assessment costs and Green Deal finance interest rates 
are reduced, interest in the Green Deal is likely to remain low. Unless the public feel that they 
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are getting value for money from the Green Deal finance package they are unlikely to join the 
scheme in the numbers required to generate the level of market demand that Government 
aspires to in its targets for the programme. Ultimately, saving money is still seen as a bigger 
driver for participation than saving energy (Dowson et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2014).  
The Green Deal Pioneer Places project has been very useful in gauging the receptiveness 
of households to energy efficiency measures, and establishing the potential in developing 
widespread and wide-reaching energy efficiency policies for the residential sector. Over the 
five year period of the current Government, the Green Deal has failed to deliver the level of 
uptake party 
opposition promising to scrap the scheme if they were elected in May 2015 (Carrington, 
2013). Given this background it is important to learn what we can from this project and the 
Green Deal more generally to inform and improve future energy efficiency schemes if the 
UK government is to meet the legally binding targets set out in the Climate Change Act 
(2008).  
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